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FOREWORD

In

the three years since its

inception,

the

University of Puget Sound Law School has achieved
unparalleled success in legal education.

Dean

Sinclitico and the law faculty have demonstrated a
dedication to scholarship that presages a future
of academic excellence.

Striving to attain a qual-

ity of legal writing and analysis commensurate with
the nascent tradition at this law school,
torial

the Edi-

Board publishes this intramural edition.

Hopefully this volume, published for the benefit of
our students and faculty,

represents a first

and

significant step toward a national law review that
will serve the legal community and enhance the reputation of the law school.
The Board wishes to express its gratitude to
the faculty,

particularly Professor Thomas Holdych,

who has contributed much time and energy to the
arduous task of founding the University of Puget
Sound Law Review.

Michael C. Hayden
Editor in Chief
1975-76
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COMIENTS

FOUNDED SUSPICION:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RESPONSE TO ALMEIDA SANCHEZ*

Two immigration patrol officers were monitoring traffic
approximately ten to fifteen miles north of the Mexican border, when they observed a car riding low in the rear and apparently driven by a Mexican. Suspecting that the automobile
might be transporting illegal aliens, the officers stopped it
to conduct a routine inquiry. One agent approached the driver
while the other walked to the rear of the car, looked in the
window and noticed blue cellophane-wrapped packages wedged between two floor panels. Since he had seen kilo packages of
marijuana hundreds of times before, the officer immediately
concluded the driver was importing contraband. The agents
then searched the car, discovered several kilograms of marijuana and arrested the driver, Bugarin-Casas, who was later
convicted in federal district court for possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
The agents' actions in United States v. Bugarin-Casaa
typify the conduct of federal officers who routinely stop and
search suspicious vehicles near the Mexican border . 2
Ninth
*Following the completion of this article, the United States Supreme

Court, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,

U.S.

, 95 S. Ct. 2574,

45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975), upheld the doctrine of founded suspicion. The
Court relied heavily on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the case in which the Court earlier sustained the doctrine of "stop and frisk."
'484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136, 94 S. Ct.
881, 238 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1974).
See Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970) (agent
discovered marijuana when looking inside a trunk for illegal aliens); United States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970) (agent discovered marijuana when looking under the hood of the automobile for aliens); Roa-Rodriquez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969) (agent found heroin
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Circuit courts generally uphold such detentive stops of vehicles by applying the doctrine of "founded suspicion," which
merely requires the border officer to justify his actions by
reciting one or more objective facts reasonably -creating suspicion.

For example,

lowing assertions
car was

riding low,

smuggling, 4.that

the Ninth Circuit

as constituting
3

that

the car

it

or that the car was dusty'.

the

another car too closely,

5

Moreover, the circuit continues

automobile searches based on information discovered

by the officer following the stop. 7
der officer

that

was the type of vehicle used in

was following
6

.to approve

has- accepted the .fol-

founded suspicion:

can make a

full

admissible evidence despite

Thus

the industrious bor-

search of an automobile and obtain
his initial

lack of probable cause

to indicate that the vehicle -contained aliens

or contraband.

inside jacket in the trunk); Barba-Reyes v. United States, 387 F.2d 91 (9th
Cir. 1967) (agent smelled marijuana when searching trunk for aliens and then
searched behind back seat); Renteria-Medina v. United States, 346 F.2d 853
(9th Cir. 1965) (agent discovered heroin in alien's notebook); Fernandez v.
United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963) (agent searched under hood of
car after smelling marijuana).
3
5ee United States v. Olivares, 496 F.2d: 657 '(5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Portillo,
469 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Roberts, 470 F.2d 858
(9th Cir.
1972).
4
See United States v. Olivares, 496 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Martinez-Tapia, 499 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1974).
•
See
Se....
United States v. Martinez-Tapia, 499 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir.. 1974);
United States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Barragan-Martinez, 504 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Portillo, 469 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1972). Smugglers often use two vehicles, the
front car serving as a scout, closely followed by the rear car, which carries the aliens.
6See United States v. Ojeda-Rodriquez, 502 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1974).
7
S See. United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.2d£455 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972, 94 S. Ct. 3178, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1143 (1974); United States v. Vital-Padilla, 500 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ojeda-Rodriquez, 502 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
Cf. United States v. Barragan-Martinez, 504 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974) (court refused to take judicial notice of* a smuggling modus operandi employing a scout car behind the
load car and held that border patrol agents did not have founded suspicion
to stop the automobile).
Even where there is no search subsequent to the
stop and the only purpose of the stop is to question the passengers about
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3

Considering the difficulty of interdicting smugglers and
aliens at the Mexican border, the Ninth Circuit's ready acceptance of founded suspicion to justify searches near the border
is not surprising. 8 The United States Supreme Court, however,
has consistently held that the mere presence of an important
governmental interest does not justify vitiating Fourth Amendment protections. 9 The Fourth Amendment requires courts to
scrutinize closely the interests of the individual prior to
concluding that the interests of the government, however exigent and compelling, are paramount. 10
This comment, after
analyzing the conceptual underpinnings of automobile seizure
law and "stop and frisk"--the possible grounds supporting the
founded suspicion doctrine--concludes that the doctrine is unconstitutional 'as presently applied to cases arising near the
border.
The authority of customs and immigration officers to
search persons and vehicles crossing the border is both longstanding and uncontroverted. 11

This plenary power to search

their nationality, the court has held that there must .be founded suspicion.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc),

cert. grwited,: 95 S. Ct. 40 (1974),

United States v. Esquer-Rilvera, 500

F.2d 313 (1974).
8

See generaZly Hearings on La Enforcement on the Sou7est Border
Before a Suboon,,. of the House Comm. on Goverrnent Operations, 93rd Cong.,
2d Seas., (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 earings].
ISee, e.g., Almeida Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273, 93
S. Ct.
2535, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973).
.10See,
e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
20 L. Ed.
2d 889 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 87 S. Ct.
1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967).
IThe first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of
duties allowed customs agents to board any vessel seeking entrance into
the United States to search for goods subject to duty. Act of July 31,
1789, ch. 5, S 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (now 19 U.S.C. S 482 [1970]).
Customs
agents also have statutory authority "to go on board . . . any . . . ves-

sel at any place in the United States . . - and search the vehicle" for
contraband. 19 U.S.C. S 1581(a) (1970).
In 1875, Congress granted immi-,
gration officials a similar authority to search for aliens. Act of March 3,
1875, ch. 141, S 5, 18 Stat. 477 (now 8 U.S.C. S 1225(a) [1970]). Then in

1946, Congress empowered Immigration officers to search any vehicle within
a "reasonable distance" of the border.
Act of Aug. 7, 1946, ch. 768, 60

14
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at the border has proved ineffective, however, in controlling
illegal immigration and smuggling.

12

Congress and the federal

courts have responded to the border officials' plight by allowing them ever-increasing latitude to search away from the border.

13

Although courts initially required that customs searches

be conducted near the border to qualify as functionally equivalent to border searches,
further
lency

the Ninth Circuit later

from the border by modifying its
1

4

definition

Congress granted even greater flexibility

upheld searches
of equivato federal

Stat. 865 (now Immigration Arrests and Seizures Act, 8 U.S.C. S 1357(a)(3)
[19:70])." In both Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L.
Ed. 746 (1886) and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280,
68 L. Ed. 543 (1925), the Court reaffirmed, in dictum, the power of the
federal government to conduct searches at fhe border without probable cause
or a warrant. Likewise, the Court in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973), although striking down
searches conducted without probable cause by roving patrols away from the
border, reaffirmed the powerof federal officials to conduct "routine inspections and searches of individuals or conveyances" at the border.
413
U.S. at'272. The Court implied that the exception to the probable cause
requirement was reasonable in light of the government's power to exclude
aliens
andgenei'aZty
contraband as a means of rational self-protection. Id.
'2See

Hadley, A Critical Analysis of the Wetback ProbLem, 21

L.

& CONTEMP. PROB.

334: (1956); Note,

In Search of the Border: Searches

Conducted by Federal Custome and Immigration Officers, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L.
& PoL. 93 (1972).
Although border officials maintain constant surveillance
over regular ports of entry, they obviously are unable to surveil continually the entire 2,000-mile Mexican border. Of the 39,000 deportable aliens
located by the Border Patrol traffic-checking operations in 1972, 30,000
entered the United States at a place other than a port of entry. AlreidaSanchea,
413 U.S. at 294 (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, the number of
deportable Mexican aliens'located in the United States grew from 77,000 in
1967 to over 348,000 in 1971, 83% of: the total number of deportable aliens
discovered in that year.
Additionally, in 1971 immigration officers uncovered over $5,000,000 worth of drugs. 1971 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 151-52.
-"Cases cited at note 2 supa.
"Initially federal courts struck down searches too far removed from
the'border.
See, e.g., Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63 (9th Cir.
1961) (72 miles); Cerventes v. United States,i263 F.2d.800 (9th Cir. 1959)
(70 miles); but see Ramirez
United States, 263F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1959)
(75 miles, border search upheld).
The Ninth Circuit, however, in United
States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
947 (1971), concluded that the vehicle need not have crossed the border in
order:for an extended border search to be conducted.
The new definition
of' functional equivalency encompassed searches where the customs agent was

15
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immigration officers, empowering them to stop and search any
5

vehicle within a reasonable distance of the border. 1
Supreme Court, however,

invalidated such a search in

The
AZmeida-

Sanchez V. United States. "6
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, having postponed ar-

gument in Bugarin-Caeas pending the outcome of Almeida-Sanchez,
narrowly interpreted the Supreme court's opinion. In AlmeidaSanchez, federal agents discovered marijuana while searching
without probable cause for illegal aliens under the seat of
the defendant's automobile.
government's

argument that

The Supreme Court rejected the
both the stop and the search were

valid exercises of statutory power and concluded that an automobile search requires probable cause regardless of any manifes
"reasonably certain" that parcels had been smuggled across the border and
placed in a vehicle, or that a person who might be carrying contraband had
crossed the border illegally and entered a vehicle. The court never expressly defined reasonable certainty, although the court later implied that
it would defer to the experience of the border authorities. United States
v. Markham, 440 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1971).

"s8 U.S.C. S 1357(a)(3) (1970).

Reasonable distance was later defined

to mean within 100 air miles of the border. 8 C.F.R. S 287.1(a)(2). Within the 100-mile area immigration officers in the Ninth Circuit could search
without any showing of cause, even though customs agents were required to
have at least a minimum level of suspicion to search for drugs. See note
14 supra. Originally this distinction may have been reasonable since the
customs agents were empowered to conduct a more extensive search than the
immigration official, who was restricted to searching where an alien might
be concealed; see Roa-Rodriquez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir.
The greater level of intrusion allowed in a customs search would
1969).
seem to require a greater show of cause. But in practice there was very
little difference between a customs or immigration search. Pursuant to 19
U.S.C. S 1401(1) (1970), the Secretary of the Treasury authorized local
customs agents to appoint border patrol officers as acting customs officers.
Customs Delegation Order No. 42, 36 Fed. Reg. 13410 (1971). Equipped with
the authority of both offices, immigration agents then stopped any vehicle
within 100 miles of the border and conducted a full customs search. See.
United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1972) and United
States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1972), approving this
"two-hat" theory. Logically there should be no constitutional difference
between a search conducted by an immigration agent and one conducted by a
customs agent. See United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 464
(9th Cir. 1971) (Browning, J., dissenting).
16413 U.S. 266, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973).

16

Seattle University Law Review

6

UPS LAW REVIEW

[Fall

urgency created by the border problem.
of the Court asserted that
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probable cause.

"8

17

Moreover,

the stop as well-as
Nevertheless,

a plurality

the search re-

the Ninth Circuit,

con-

struing Almeida-Sanchez as applicable to roving searches only,
maintained
biles

that

on less

federal officers

could stop and detain automo9

than probable cause. 1

To support its

decision,

the court resurrected founded suspicion, a relatively obscure
17Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273, 93 S. Ct. 2535,
37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973).
'eThe plurality quoted from Chief Justice.Taft's opinion for the Court
in Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543
(1925):
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the
chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity
of such a search.
Travellers may be so stopped in crossing
an international boundary because of national self-protection
reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects
which may be lawfully brought in.
But those Zawfully within
the country, entitled to- use the public highways, have a right
to free passage without interruption or search unless there is
known to a competent official
authorized to search, probable
cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal mdracndise.. 413 U.S. at 274-75, citing 267
U.S. at 153-54.: (emphasis added)
'9452 F.2d 459, 460 (1971). Neither the Fifth nor the Tenth Circuits
are in accord with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Almeida-Sanchez.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the. United States v. Byrd, 483 F.2d
1196. (1973), aff'd on rehear-Ing, 494 F.2d 1284 (1974), apparently decided
that the stop as well,as the subsequent search had to be based on probable
cause. In United States v. Miller, 492 F.2d 37 (19.74), however, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that AZmeida-Sanchez was not retroactive to searches
conducted prior to the date of the decision. Thereafter, the court reconsidered Byrd and affirmed its earlier decision on the basis of pre-AlmeidaSanchez s.taudards.
Accord, United States v. Speed, 489 F.2d 478 (5th .Cr..
1973), aff'd on rehearing, 497 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Olivares, 496 F.2d 657 (1974) (case arose after the Court's decision in
Abneida-Sanchea)., The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interprets AlmsidaSanchez more narrowly than either the Fifth or the Ninth. The court maintains that AZmeida-Sanchez does not affect the statutory right of immigration officers, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. S 1357(a)(1) (1970), to stop and interrogate a person believed to be an alien regarding his right to remain
in the country.
United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973);
accord, United States v. Newman, 490 F. 2d 993 (10th Cir. 1974).

17
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doctrine originally arising in the context of general police
work. 20
Following Bugarin-Casas the Ninth Circuit has relied almost exclusively on founded suspicion to justify automotive
stops and searches near the border. 2 1 That reliance appears
misplaced considering the rule of law quoted by the AtmeidaSanchez plurality from the Supreme Court's decision in
25

Carroll

Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966), the seminal decision
relating to founded suspicion, arose out of a routine police investigation
rather than a border encounter. In Wilson, two police officers noticed the
defendant's car slowly drive by them twice during the predawn hours. The
officers followed the vehicle after the second pass and directed the driver
to pull over by flashing their red light. At the officer's request a passenger seated to the right of the driver opened the door and stepped out of
the car. Thereupon one of the officers, shining his flashlight through the
open door, noticed what appeared to be the barrel of i gun protruding from
underneath the front seat. After ascertaining that the object was a pistol,
the officers arrested both the driver and passenger for possession of an illegal weapon.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus
issued by the federal district court, concluded that the stop of the defendant's automobile was valid. Even though the officers in Wilson failed to
articulate the reasons that led them to stop the car, the court discerned
from the record circumstances which might reasonably have prompted their action. An officer, according to the court, should not be required to reconstruct his motivations, which at the time of the event may have been ndthing
more than the "instinctive reaction of one trained in the prevention of
crime." Id. at 415. Thus, the court in ilson was apparently reluctant to
scrutinize closely the investigative conduct of police officers and was
willing to grant considerable deference to the officer's unarticulated in;tuition. Founded suspicion was all that was necessary to justify the temporary detention of the vehicle and its passengers. Subsequent to Wilson and
prior to Bugarin-Caas, the doctrine of founded suspicion appeared primarily
in cases involving general police investigation. But see United States v.
Jackson, 423 F.2d 506 (1970) (the first reported case relying on Wilson to
support a detentive stop by a federal officer near the border); United
States v. Roberts, 470 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Oswald,
441 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Zubia-Sanchez, 448 F.2d 1232
(9th Cir. 1971).
2 'The Ninth Circuit observed in United States v. Larios-Montes, 500
F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974) that:
[T]he government seems to be turning more and more to
the doctrine of "founded suspicion" to justify searches and
seizures that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment as
expounded in Aleida-Sanchez. Id. at 942.

18
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v. United States. 22 In Carroll, the Court concluded that a
person lawfully on the highways has a right to free passage
without. interruption unless probable cause exists to believe
the vehicle is carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. 23
Since the Court has never expressly overruled or modified the
Carroll rule, any authority for departing from its strict mandate must be found in related areas in which the Court has
spoken--automobile seizure law and the doctrine of stop and
frisk.
In the few cases squarely presenting the issue of a forcible automobile stop, the Supreme Court required probable
2
cause. ' Carroll v. United States, decided in 1925, concerned
a search similar to those arising today near the Mexican border. At that time, "bootleggers" smuggled liquor across the
border at Detroit, Michigan, and drove to a primary market
area at Grand Rapids.
Federal prohibition agents; aware of
the heavy traffic in illegal liquor, were patrolling the main
highway between Grand Rapids and Detroit when they recognized
Carroll's car from prior encounters. After stopping. the car
and searching it, the agents discovered a large quantity of
contraband whiskey. The Court upheld the stop and search,
concluding that the agents' specific knowledge of Carroll's
illegal operations constituted probable cause to believe that
he was carrying illegal liquor; absent probable cause, the
Court emphasized, both the stop and the ensuing search would
have violated the Fourth Amendment. 2 5 Thus, despite the widespread national problem, the Court was unwilling to reduce
2 2

See note 18 supra.

2 3-d.
2
4Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543
(1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed.
1879 (1949); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed.
2d 134 (1959).
25
See note 18 supru. Relying on Carroll, the Supreme Court in Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949), upheld a stop and search of a vehicle carrying illegally
imported liquor.
The
Court reaffirmed the Carroll
rationale by stating that "mere suspicion" vas

2006]
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9

constitutional protections to facilitate law enforcement.
Despite the clear language of Carroll, lower courts have
upheld certain types of detentive automobile stops without requiring probable cause. 26

Police officers routinely set up
roadblocks to check vehicle licenses, registrations, and equipment and, less frequently, conduct checks on a roving basis.
No court has cited the Carroll rule to invalidate such a road2 7
block
and only one court has relied on Carroll to find a
roving license check unconstitutional .28
When courts sustain
a routine vehicle license or equipment check, however, they
insufficient justification for intruding on the rights of a traveller by
detaining him and subjecting him to the indignity of a search. The Court,
however, may have been less committed to the rationale of Carroll than
would appear at first
blush. The lower court in Brinegzr, perhaps presaging the doctrine of founded suspicion, had held that evidence obtained after a stop based on suspicion could be used to establish probable cause
for the subsequent search, 165 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1947):
The question presented then is whether the investigators.
having sufficient information to suspect Brinegar, but not sufficient information to constitute probable cause for a search
of the coupe and the arrest of Brinegar, could, after stopping
him and interrogating him with respect to whiskey in the coupe,
lawfully act upon the information obtained as a basis for probable cause for the search and seizure. Id. at 515.
Instead of reversing the conviction for an erroneous interpretation of the
law, the Court expended considerable effort in showing that both the district court and the court of appeals were wrong in concluding there was no
probable cause for the stop. In so doing the Court was able to affirm the
conviction
without overruling Caroll.
26
See, e.g., Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965);
Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966); Morgan
v. Town of Heidelburg, 246 Miss. 481, 150 So. 2d 512 (1963); State v. Williams, 237 S.C. 252, 116 S.E.2d 858 (1960); City of Miami v. Aronovitz,
114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959).
See generally Note Nonarrest Autonvbile Stops:
Unconstitutional
Seizures of the Person, 25 STAN. L. REv. 865 (1973).
27

See, e.g., Cook, Vare ties of Detention and the Fourth Amendment, 23

ALA. L.

REV. 287 (1971).

28Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875
(1973);

cf. State
v. Colman, 254 Or. 1, 6 n.2, 456 P.2d 67, 69 n.2 (1969) (the Oregon Supreme
Court expressly reserved ruling upon "the right to stop and examine the
driver's operating license or the right to stop at a general roadblock");
United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971) (dictum) (the cOurt
expressed doubts about the constitutionality of "spot checks" of drivers'
licenses).

20
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generally stress the administrative nature of the procedure.

2 9

In an administrative stop the officer's primary responsibility
is insuring citizen compliance with safety regulations. Since
the emphasis is upon correcting vehicle defects rather than
upon detecting possible criminal activity, the stops are not
accusatory and are less coercive than investigative stops designed to ferret out crime.30

Moreover, the brief intrusion

appears justified considering the strong governmental interest
in highway safety and the lack of alternative means to accomplish the desired regulation.

3

1

9

" See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 442 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Berry, 369 F.2d 386 (3rd Cir. 1966); Lipton v. United
States, 348 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1965); State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194
S.E.2d
9 (1973).
3
0Courts recognize that the officer's reason for stopping a vehicle
determines to a large extent whether the stop will be offensive to the vehicle's occupants. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573, 583
n.25 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd
411 U.S. 389 (1973) (cert.
denied with respect to Fourth Amendment claim) where the court asserted that, depending
on the motivation of the police officers, the "spot check" might be "a minor
intrusion for a public health and safety purpose" or an "investigation
_ .
focusing on a particular individual ....
."
cf.
Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) and See v. City of
Seattle,
387 U.S. 541, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967),
dealing with
administrative searches to detect housing code violations. Police occasionally use roadblocks as a means of detecting criminal activity rather than
vehicle defects or expired licenses. In one instance a five-hour roadblock
on Chicago's south side reportedly stopped 1,190 cars, out of which seven
persons were arrested for narcotics violations, five for drunk driving and
six for driving without a license.
Foote, The Fourth Amendment, Obstacle or
Necessity in the Laz of Arrest,
51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 402, 406 (1960).
Such an indiscriminate use of the roadblock appears to circumvent unconstitutionally the warrant requirement and at least one court has so held. See
Wirin v. iorrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948); of. People v.
Hyde, 12 Cal. App. 3d 158, 524 P.2d 830, 833, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974).
A
roadblock to catch a fleeing felon appears to stand on a different footing
since the police have probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.
See Williams v. State, 226 Md. 614, 174 A.2d 719 (1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 855 (1962); State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932);
Kagel v. Brugger, 19 Wis. 2d 1, 119 N.W.2d 394 (1963); see also
United States
v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds,
414 U.S. 218 (1973),
in which Judge Bazelon observed that "[t]he applicable
police regulations . . . may conceivably be interpreted as hints encouraging
the 3use of spot checks to conceal Fourth Amendment violations."
'See generally Cook supra note 27.
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Detentive automobile stops conducted near the border by
on the other hand, are both accusatory and
Customs and immigration officers, having no
investigatory.
authority to check for minor violations of state motor vehicle
federal officers,

c9des, are responsible solely for discovering illegal aliens
or drugs. 3 2
Officers searching for illegal aliens and drugs
are likely to carry out a completely different type of inquiry
The
than officers checking turn signals and drivers' licenses.
type of questions asked of a potential smuggler would logically
be directed toward discovering his destination, past travels,
general character and other matters normally considered personal.
Such questions, especially when asked in an accusatory
context, are likely to be a substantial affront to an innocent
3
These stops are therefore more intrusive
citizen's dignity. s
than administrative stops and cannot be supported by the same
reasoning.
By contrast, stop and frisk, a police technique
3
enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, " portends a criminal accusation
and engenders considerable coercion, thus providing a better
3 5
analogy to founded suspicion.

See United States v. Jackson, 423 F.2d 506, 508 (9th Cir. 1970), in
which the court distinguished the narrowly defined duties of the federal
border authorities from the general law enforcement duties of local and
state police.
"3See generally Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75
YALE L.J. 1161 (1966).
Although the
, 34392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
Supreme Court did not announce "stop and frisk" until Terry v. Ohio, the
dissent in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d
134 (1959), presaged the doctrine nine years earlier. In Henry a majority
of the Court, following Carroll, rejected the opportunity to define the
minimum evidentiery standard for an automobile stop and instead accepted
the government's concession that the stop, without more, constituted an
arrest. Since at the time of the stop the police did not have probable
cause to make an arrest, the Court reversed the conviction without considerlhg whether the police conduct was reasonable. Justice Clark and Chief
Justice Warren dissented. In their view, the police were justified in
stopping the petitioner's car after observing suspicious conduct. Thus,
they argued, the Court's overly rigid definition of arrest excluded evidence obtained by reasonable and therefore constitutional means.
* 35See generally LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peter and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. REv. 39 (1968).
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In Terry, the Supreme Court upheld the de.tentive stop of
a pedestrian despite the police officer's lack of probable..

cause to make an arrest. A police officer in that case observed two men walk back and.forth in front of .a store approximate.ly twenty-four times, pausing each time to look in .the window.
A third man joined the pair for a. moment and then quickly
departed, thereafter followed by the other two- The officer,suspecting that the three individuals were casing the store for
a robbery, approached them and asked their names.
In .response,
one- of the men "mumbled something."
The officer: immediately
spun him around,. frisked him, and discovered a concealed wea-"
pon.
The Court sustained the subsequent arrest and conviction,
concluding that the defendant.'s conduct as observed by the arresting officer, though not risingi• to the level of probable
cause, provided reasonable grounds for the stop and frisk. 36
--According to Chief -Justice.Warren, the. Terry holding
brought within judicial scrutiny an area of police. conduct:
that had previously escaped review. 17 . Prior to Terry, lower
courts faced a Hobson's choice.38. If they defined an arrest
broadly, as any interference with individual freedom of movement, they would be requiring probable cause for all: stops."
Alternatively, if they. defined an arrest narrowly, as taking
an individual into custody so .that he might answer for a crime,
the police officer would decide when the arrest occurred. .0
Until the moment when he intended to take the suspect into
36 392 U.S.

at 21-22:
U.S. at 16. The Court "emphatically" rejected 'the idea that seizures which do not result in a formal arrest are outside the purview of the

17392

Fourth Amendment.
"
36
Named for Tobias Hobson, the English currier
commemorated by Miiton
in tvo epitaphs.
It was rumored that Hobsdn compelled customers to choose
between leasing the "nag" next ;to the stabledoor or walking.
The term now

means' that a person is" forced to make a choice between two unattractive alternatives.
"See

geierally

58 J. CRIM.
"

-'d.

Pilchar, The Law and Practice

of

Field

L.C. & P.S. 465;(1967); LaFave, supra note"35.

Interrogqtion..,
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custody, the officer could detain him without any justification whatsoever. Thus, a court's choice was to hamper unduly
police investigation by requiring probable cause for all stops
or to allow the police to determine what constituted an arrest,
thereby granting them almost unreviewable discretion.
The Court in Terry attempted to solve this problem by
avoiding the labeling of particular types of police conduct.4 1
According to the Court, the reasonableness of the conduct
should be assessed by balancing the governmental interest in
detecting and preventing crime against the invasion that the
search or seizure entails. 1 2 To aid the Court's balancing,
the officer must allege specific and articulable facts, known
to him at the moment of the search or seizure, reasonably warranting the intrusion."
Theoretically, the judge could provide retrospectively the same constitutional protection that
the warrant procedure would have provided prospectively."4
Although the Terry Court indicated that all intrusions
were subject to the reasonableness test, it expressly reserved
the question of the minimum justification for the detentive
"1 The "rigid all-or-nothing model of justification," according to Chief
Justice Warren, "obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well
as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional regulation.'
392 U.S. at 17. The Court has not escaped the problem of categorizing types
of police conduct, Terry notwithstanding. Particularly when dealing with
the issue of Miroia warnings, [as required by the Court's earlier holding
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966):
the Court finds it necessary to define the point at which an arrest occurred.
See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S. Ct. 1095, 22 L. Ed. 2d 311
(1969).
42392 U.S. at 19, 21.
4 31d. at 22.
""See generally La~ave supra note 35, in which the author suggests that
probable cause is nothing more than a determination that the police conduct
was reasonable. While the quantum of evidence required for a stop on the
street might be less than that required to take a suspect to the station
house, both require a showing of reasonableness. This method of analysis
results in defining probable cause as a variable quantum of evidence which
justifies particular levels of intrusion. See also Note, United States v.,
BaiLey: Probable Cause and Reasonableness Tests under the Fourth Amendment A Distinction Without a Difference?, 45 TEMPtE L.Q. 610 (1972).
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stop of a pedestrian. 45

The Court implied that an officer

could approach a pedestrian in the interest of detecting and
preventing crime, but it did not articulate the specific individual interests potentially invaded by such a stop. The majority avoided the issue by assuming that no detention of the
6
petitioner occurred until the moment the officer frisked him."
The Court upheld the frisk itself by balancing the officer's
interest in self-protection, based on his reasonable suspicion
that the petitioner might be armed and dangerous, with the
limited intrusion the frisk entailed. 7
The Court in Terry perhaps intentionally avoided detailed
analysis of the conflicting interests involved in detentive
stops, since no empirical evidence was available to evaluate

the merits of the procedure. 4

Nevertheless, several policy
considerations, apparently unconsidered by the Court, arguably
support the use of forcible stops. First, physical evidence
may be discovered during a frisk incident to the stop; second,

the suspect may make inculpatory statements; third, police
visibility may deter the commission of crimes; and fourth, the
officer may detain the suspect while obtaining information concerning the possible crime. When-balancing each of these potential interests against the intrusiveness of the. stop to the
individual, the Court will not have the benefit of a precise
formula for defining reasonableness." 9

Nevertheless, the Court

must determine which of the above interests it can properly
45392 U.S.
6

at 19 nu16.

S Id. at 19. Justice Harlan criticized the Terry majority for avoiding
the difficult issue of when an officer may forcibly stop a suspect for investigatory purposes. Id. at 32. (Harlan, J., concurring).
Unfortunately,
Justice Harlan, though recognizing the majority's short-comings, also failed
to provide an adequate explanation for sustaining the stop.
47Id. at 27.
4 See Brief for Nat'l. Dist. Attorney's Ass'n. as amicus curiae at 12,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
43The Supreme Court has long recognized that, in the final analysis, the

test of reasonableness is common sense. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 357, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374 (1931).
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consider in the balance."0 A stop, for example, cannot be
justified by evidence discovered during the frisk. To do so
would be tantamount to justifying an arrest by evidence obtained during a search incident to the arrest. The Supreme
Court has emphatically concluded that such bootstrapping is
impermissible. "'
A more difficult issue is whether the stop can be justified as a means of eliciting incriminating information from
the person detained. In Miranda v. Arizona5 2 the Supreme Court
held that a person must be advised of his Fifth and Sixth Amend
ment rights anytime he "has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedoms in any significant way."5 3
If
Miranda applies to every official interrogation, the utility
of investigative stops as an information gathering tool would
be greatly reduced. The Supreme Court, however, probably will
not require
Despite the
possibility
silent, the

Miranda warnings in investigative street encounters
relatively coercive atmosphere of the stop and the
that the suspect is unaware of his right to remain
Court may presume that the suspect "voluntarily"
cooperated with the police. In an analogous factual situation
involving the issue of whether a valid consent to search requires actual knowledge of the right to refuse, the Court implied that the interest in gaining information possibly outweighs the suspect's right to be informed of his constitutional
"According to Professor Gunther, the most important trait of responsible balancing is the capacity to identify and evaluate separately each
analytically distinct ingredient of the contending interests. Gunther, The
Suprene Court 1971 Term, Foreuard: In Search of EvoZving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1,
7 (1972).
51
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917
(1968); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 30 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134
(1959); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L.
Ed. 436 (1948).
52384
U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
53
Id. at 444.
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5 4

guarantees.

Thus, the Court may presume the suspect's volun-

waiver rather than require the Miranda warnings"

tary

s

which

discourage the suspect from cooperating.
Yet,

is

even assuming the warning

suspect chooses not to cooperate,

not required,

the officer

5 6

if

the

probably cannot

Unfortunately, the Supreme

compel him to answer questions.

Court has never answered the thorny question of whether police
can legitimately detain an uncooperative suspect solely to compel cooperation.

s 7

Logic indicates, however, that the police

should not be empowered to compel

information the suspect has
5 8

a constitutional right to withhold.
refusal

to answer be a factor
5
cause for an arrest exists .
54

in

Nor should the suspect's

determining whether probable

9

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2040, 36 L. Ed. 2d
854 (1973) (consent search held voluntary despite the fact that no Miranda
warning was given). Although the Court asserted that it was considering
Miranda from the standpoint of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, its decision
not to require Miranda warning appears to be framed in terms of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
55
Cf. People v. Henze, 253 Cal. App. 2d 986, 61 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1967) (Hendron, J., dissenting).
56
J., concurring).
5 7 See Terry v. Ohio., 392 U.S. at 34 (White,
The issue of compelled citizen cooperation was raised in Wainwright v.
City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968), but the Court, after accepting
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.
certiorari,
58
Justice White expressed this more clearly than the Terry majority. He
observed that there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to citizens in the street. But only under
"special circumstances" (i.e., the need for a protective frisk) may the person be detained; otherwise he may refuse to cooperate and go his way. 392
U.S. at 34.
5 9
See 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring); see also United States v.
Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 86 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), in which the court said
"that the defendants in this case had a constitutional right to remain silent when questioned by police or other investigatory agents or bodies, but
they chose not to do so. Had they chosen such a course, they would have
suffered no penalty." Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(dicta). Brooks v. United States, 159 A.2d 876 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960).
Suspects, however, rarely refuse to cooperate with the police. In one empirical study it was reported that of 300 field interrogations in Chicago,
in not one instance did the suspect refuse to answer questions. Pilcher,
The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 465,
475 (1967).
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Even if detentive stops cannot be justified as a means t,
frisk for evidence or as a way to compel the cooperation of a
suspect, valid rationales for allowing forcible street encoun.
ters still exist.

Consider the following hypotheticals:

(i) A police officer hears a scream coming
from an unidentified source in an apartment building. Moments later he observes an individual leaving the building. 60
(ii) At 2:00 a.m. a police officer notices two
individuals walking back and forth in front of a
store window, intermittently whispering
and care6
fully scrutinizing the merchandise . '
In both of these situations the officers should intervene, albeit for a different reason in each case.
In the first
hypothetical, notwithstanding the lack of
probable cause, the officer should detain the suspect until hc
determines the source of the scream. 6 2 Admittedly, the suspect may be totally innocent, but the public interest in detecting crime appears to outweigh the minimal intrusion causec
by detaining the suspect.
The rationale for allowing intervention by the officer ir
the second hypothetical is

perhaps even more compelling.
Some
commentators maintain that the principal purpose of the stop
and frisk power is to prevent crime rather than to investigate
crimes already committed. 63 Arguably, in the second hypothet!
cal police visibility will prevent the crime."4
An individual
is less likely to commit a crime if he realizes the police are
not only present but also suspicious of his activity.
60

Kaufman, J., posed this hypothetical in his opinion in United States
v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grotwds
(2d Cir. 1960).
"tThis set of facts is similar to People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964) as well as Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
62
Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed.
2d 612
(1972).
63
See LaFave, supra note 35; The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 6 178, 182 (1968).
4See LaFave,
supra note 35.
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Maintaining the status quo to allow the officer to obtain
evidence from other sources and increasing police visibility
as a deterrent to crime apply to general investigatory detentions of automobiles as well as to forcible stops of pedes-

trians. 65

Had the suspect left the apartment building by auto-

mobile in hypothetical number one, it would have been even more
essential for the officer to intervene.

The suspect's greater

mobility increases the difficulty of apprehending him later if
the officer allows him to proceed while investigating
sibility

of a crime.

the pos-

Similarly, in the second hypothetical the

presence of an automobile would make a forcible stop no less
reasonable.

The need to dissuade suspects from committing a

crime is equally compelling.

These same rationales, however,

do not justify forcible automobile stops conducted by federal
officers near the border.
In carrying out their duties near the border, federal ofstop vehicles for a different purpose than do general

ficers

law enforcement officers. 6

6

Immigration and customs officials

assigned to the border area are not engaged in the general prevention and detention of crime.
trols

When they conduct roving pa-

away from the border their sole responsibility is

cover illegal aliens or drugs. 6

7

to dis-

Customs or immigration offi-

cers gain nothing by forcibly stopping an automobile solely to
65

But see Note, Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures
of the Person, 25 STAN. L. REv. 865 (1973), in which the author argues that
automobile stops are inherently more intrusive than stops of pedestrians.
Thus, according to the author, the minimum evidentiary requirement for auto
stops should be probable cause. A contrary view--that auto stops are less
intrusive than pedestrian stops--has also been advocated. See, e.g., State
v. Fish, 280 Minn. 163, 167, 159 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1968).
This latter view
rests on one of two premises: that permission to drive a motor vehicle is
a privilege, and therefore can be peremptorily denied or that the extensive
amount of regulation reduces the expectation of privacy. Only the latter
of these two arguments seems persuasive. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV.
1439 (1968).
6

66 See
United States v. Majourau, 474 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1973).
7
1d. The court maintained that customs agents are not "general guardians of the public peace" but are federal officers with "duties and powers
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These officers have no extraneous

source of information from which they can determine whether
smuggling exists, since no effective communication apparently
takes place between the roving patrols and the intelligencegathering arms of the two agencies. 6 8 Moreover, even assuming that the vehicle carries drugs or aliens and has recently
crossed the border, the guilty parties probably left
no incriminating evidence at the border.
Illegal aliens and soft drug
smugglers enter the United States surreptitiously at unsupervised crossings."' Hard drug smugglers, on the other hand,
typically cross the border at regular ports of entry, where
they are either apprehended or pass through unnoticed. 70 Thus,
any automobile stopped by a roving patrol after crossing the
border probably entered the country without alerting federal
officers that it was carrying contraband. 71
Furthermore, the officer's
visibility,
perhaps effective
in specifically deterring many types of crimes, will provide
little
deterrence to smuggling.
The potential bank robber will
undoubtedly have second thoughts about committing the crime if
a police officer stops and questions him. 72
By contrast, that
kind of immediate specific deterrence is not possible in the
case of a smuggler who, when stopped, already will have substantially committed the crime. A Terry-type stop certainly
will not motivate a smuggler to recross the border or otherwise
attempt to undo the crime. The skeptic may nevertheless argue
that such stops might so unnerve smugglers that later smuggling
attempts are deterred. Increased general deterrence, however,
is unlikely.
Smugglers are aware from the outset that highly
limited to activities of the type that the title implies." See also United
States v. Jackson, 423 F.2d 506, 508 (9th Cir. 1970) and United States v.
Blackstock, 451 F.2d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
reHear ngs, supr note 8 at 19.
' 9 1d. at 22.
7°Id.
7 dtL LaFave, supra note 35.
72?See
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trained officers at the border have almost unlimited discretion to search.

Smugglers undergoing such an imminent threat

of detection will not be deterred by the knowledge that, once
across the border, they may be stopped by a federal officer
and asked some questions.

Thus, roving patrols, presumably

lacking the power to search without probable cause,
significantly

will

not

increase the deterrence already present.

The only substantial reason for allowing federal officers
to stop vehicles,

as the Ninth Circuit apparently

in United States V. Majourau,
for aliens or contraband .

7

1

73

recognized

is to permit officers to search

While the general law enforcement

officer may occasionally engage in a "fishing expedition" when
he stops a suspect, the immigration or customs officer is always "fishing."

75

At the very least the agents will want to

observe the contents of the passenger compartment,

76

and more

likely they will want to inspect all areas in which an alien
or drugs may be hidden.

77

Hypothetically, the agent must have

probable cause prior to conducting a search.

But an officer,

singularly responsible for the discovery of aliens or contraband and suspicious that the vehicle contains smuggled goods
or aliens, will be tempted to search the auto even if he does
not have probable

cause.

Many commentators and judges suggest restricting the power
78
of officials to stop individuals suspected of possessory crimes.
73474 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1973).
74Id. at 770.
75
See LaFave, supra note 35.
76
The agent's desire to observe the contents of the passenger compartment
receives considerable assistance from the "plain view" doctrine as announced
in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S. Ct. 992, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067
(1968); see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 506 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677 (9th Cit. 1974); United States v. BugarinCasas, 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 157
(6th Cir. 1973).
77See, e.g., United States v. Cullen, 499 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1974); RoaRodriquez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969); Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970).; United States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d
283 (9th Cir. 1970).
7
See Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.,
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They argue that in such cases the police are likely to abuse
their authority by conducting generalized dragnet operations
in an effort to discover evidence of crimes.

That argument

applies equally well to customs or immigration stops since the
officer's primary goal is to search the vehicle.

Without rea-

sonable suspicion, federal officers may stop and search large
They can

numbers of vehicles to obtain evidence of a crime.

later fabricate justifications for intrusions that in fact unconstitutionally invaded individual privacy.79
The protection of the Fourth Amendment breaks down when
the officer fabricates facts to justify his conduct.

Accord-

ing to Terry the notions underlying the Fourth Amendment's
warrant clause and the probable cause requirement relate as
well to detentions short of an official arrest. 80

Although

advance judicial approval through the warrant procedure is not
constitutionally required, at some point the officer's conduct
must be subjected to the "more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge."

81.

The decision in Terry presupposes, however, that

dissenting) quoted in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 149 (Douglas & Marshall,
J.J., dissenting); LaFave, supra note 44, at 65-66; cf. Sibron v. New York,
392 Il.S.40,:74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612
(1972), the Supreme Court apparently rejected the suggestion that the power
to stop be limited according to the nature of the suspected crime. The officer in Willims, having been informed that an individual seated in a nearby automobile had narcotics and a gun in the car, approached the vehicle and
asked the driver to open the door. When the man rolled down the window instead, the officer immediately reached inside and grabbed a revolver at the
spot where the informer had said the gun would be found. The officer arrested the suspect for illegal possession of the weapon and then searched
the car discovering a number of other weapons and twelve ounces of heroin.
The majority in Williams, ignoring the arguments of Judge Friendly and
the dissent, did not discuss the question of whether stops should be allowed
when the officer suspects a narcotics violation. Most likely, the Court did
not wish to draw a distinction which would be extremely difficult to enforce,
short
7 9 of excluding all drugs properly or improperly seized during a frisk.
See LaFave, supra note 35, at 65 n.126; Comment, Police Perjury in the
Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507 (1971).
80392 U.S. at 20.
m
" Id. at 21.
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the officer will provide the court with
able" facts that prompted his conduct.8

"specific and articul2

If such facts are

not available or are manufactured by the officer after the
search, the constitutional protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment are vitiated.
The judiciary's ability to scrutinize closely the officer's conduct during detentive vehicle stops near the border
appears minimal.

It

would be extremely difficult

for judges

to disbelieve an officer's assertion that the defendant admitted carrying drugs,

8 3

that he consented to the search,

that the officer smelled marijuana.85

8

4

or

In most cases judges

either have to assume the basic honesty of the police, or risk
alienating the law enforcement authority.

Under the latter

alternative, an atmosphere of mutual disrespect could jeopardize the effectiveness of the judicial process.

In rare in-

stances, the officer's testimony might be so contradictory on
cross-examination that a court would refuse to accept his version of the facts,

8

but usually courts will have to assess

the reasonableness of the invasion by objectively evaluating
the facts as the officer presents them.
Although the problem of pretext pervades search and seizure law,

8 7

Congress and the courts invite the problem when

821d .
3

0 Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 163, in which liquor
agents alleged that the petitioner admitted having twelve cases of liquor
in the car.
84Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2040, 36 L.
Ed. 2d 854 (1973); see aZso United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th
Cir. 51973); United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1973).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Ojeda-Podriquez, 502 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. Diamond, 471 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1973).
"See United States v. Portillo, 469 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Davis, 459 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1972).
87A particularly troublesome pretext problem is present in a line of
California cases dealing with "furtive gestures." Generally, the arresting
officer testifies that, while following the defendant's automobile, he saw
one of the occupants make a suspicious motion as if to hide something. After stopping the vehicle, the officer usually searches for the secreted
contraband. A group of student law review editors, after studying arrest
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they allow the customs or immigration agent less authority than
he needs to accomplish his job. In normal police work a Terrytype stop serves to deter crime, and preserve the status quo.
The same type stop, when utilized by a customs agent, is designed
primarily to find probable cause for a search. Without conducting a search a customs agent will seldom achieve his goal--uncovering goods or persons smuggled across the border. Thus, if
an agent who has founded suspicion may stop a vehicle but may
not search it without probable cause, he may be tempted to find
or to create probable cause.
Arguably, the courts' efforts to
guard the constitutional rights of citizens near the border under these circumstances, though laudable, will be totally ineffective.
The constitutionality of any search involves a balancing
of the individual's right to be free of intrusion with the extent of the government's need to investigate the individual.8 8
Although the government's interest in controlling the influx
of drugs and illegal aliens is compelling, the intrusion resulting from a non-border stop is so extensive that it affronts
basic constitutional rights. Searches at ports of entry, however, are less intrusive and hence are constitutionally justifiable. An individual crossing the border knows he may be
searched and can plan his time and activity accordingly. If
he is carrying highly personal items he may either refrain from
crossing the border or refrain from carrying those items with
him. In addition, the individual crossing the border knows the
government is not singling him out to be searched, but is treating him like- all persons who cross the'border. Thus, in most
instances, searchin. a person at the border is considerably
less offefisive than randomly searching automobiles or individual,reports, observed that officers apparently tailor their language in order to
achieve "write-in" probable cause. See Marijuana Laws: An 'mpirical Study
of Enforcement and Adninistration in Los Angeles County, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1499, 1534 n.95 (1968); 11 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 449 (1970).
88
Cases cited note 10 supra.
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in the interior."
Although the Supreme Court in Almeida-Sanchez recognized
the clear distinction between stops at the border and stops
near the border,
latter

the Ninth Circuit continues to uphold the

by resorting to the doctrine of founded suspicion.

The

court has failed, however, to provide a sound analytical basis
to support the doctrine.

Careful analysis reveals that the

only logical rationale for the doctrine--providing an opportunity for an officer to search automobiles--is

89Cf. People v.
358 (1974).

Hyde,

12 Cal.

App.

3d 158,

unconstitutional.

524 P.2d 830,

115 Cal.

Rptr.

